I would like to start this text with a definition of concepts. Without any claim to a general theory and simply for the restricted purposes of this chapter, I propose to distinguish betw een globalization and universal ism. Unde r the te rm globalization, I unde rstand a proce ss of ge ne ral disse mination (of me rchandise , te chnologie s, ne ws, political influence, religious ideas) across political and cultural boundaries and of the e nsu ing integration of various, pre viously isolate d zone s into one syste m of inte rconne ctions and inte rde pe nde ncie s, whe re all nations, e mpire s, tribe s and state s cohe re in some way or othe r through political, e co nomic or cultural re lations.
on the one hand, and Greek science and philosophy on the other, both implying an emphatic concept of Truth with a claim for universal valid ity. The two typical forms of political glob alization of the Ancient World are internationalism and imperialism.
With regard to memory, for ob vious reasons I shall limit myself to cultural memory. Memory theory distinguishes b etween personal and collective memory; within collective memory, we differentiate b etween three major aspects which we propose to designate as communicative, cul tural and political (A. Assmann 2006, 21024) . Communicative memory is a matter of socialization and communication, like consciousness in general and the acquisition of language; cultural memory is an externali zation and ob jectivation of memory, which is individual and communi cative, and evident in symb ols such as texts, images, rituals, landmarks and other 'lieux de memoire'; political memory finally shares its exter nalized, symb olical character with cultural memory, b ut is a topdown institution which depends on the political organization that institutes it, whereas cultural memory grows over centuries as an interaction b etween uncontrolled, selforganizing b ottomup accretion and controlled top down institutions more or less independent of any particular political organization.
In all its aspects, human memory is related to time and identity. Each form of memory has its specific timerange. In the case of individual memory, this is equivalent to the timerange of an individual conscious ness; communicative memory is typically limited to the time span of three interacting generations or 80100 years; political memory lasts as long as the correspondent political institution, which may b e as short as 12 years as in the case of Nazi Germany, or over 200 years as in the case of the French Repub lic or the US. The typical timerange of cultural memory is 3,000 years, going back, in the West, to Homer and the Bib lical authors and, in the East, to the Rgveda, the Buddha and other cultural foundations. 3 We may define human memory as the specific capacity of human b eings to bring about a synthesis of time and identity in the form of what may b e called 'diachronic identity'. This process of 'chronosyn thesis', b y which time is worked into the fab ric of identity, is a specifi cally human faculty b ecause it involves autonoesis; that is, the capacity of recognizing oneself in the past and projecting oneself into the future (Tulving 2002) .
The distinction of different forms of memory looks like a structure b ut it works more as a dynamics, creating tension and transition b etween the various poles. There is also much overlapping. This holds true espe cially with respect to the relationship b etween memory and identity.
We must certainly avoid falling victim to what Amartya Sen has described as the 'identity illu sion' (Sen 2006) . Individuals possess different identi ties according to the various groups, communities, beliefsystems, politi cal systems and so on to which they belong; their communicative and cultural, that is collective memories are equally multifarious. On all lev els, memory is an open system. However, it is not completely open and diffuse; there are always frames that relate memory to specific horizons of time and identity on an individual, a generational, a political and a cultural level. If this relationship is absent, then we are dealing with knowledge rather than memory. Memory is knowledge with an iden tityindex, 4 it is knowledge about oneself; that is, one's own diachronic identity, be it as an individual or as a member of a family, a generation, a community, a nation or a cultural and religious tradition.
From all of these rather abstract definitions and deliberations, we may derive the insight that memory and globalization work in opposite directions. Memory functions in the direction of identity which, in all of its fuzziness, always implies a notion of difference. Globalization, on the other hand, works in the direction of diffusion, blurring all bounda ries and bridging all differences. Since something like global identity cannot exist, the concept of global memory is a paradoxical notion.
As an Egyptologist, I am particularly interested in the historical dimen sion of this opposition and the tensions that it may have created in the past. Moves towards globalization should have presented severe challenges for the organization of cultural memory. If this is correct, it should, therefore, be interesting to study if and how in the past specific societies reacted to tendencies of globalization by reorganizing their cultural memories. In the following, I would like to briefly and prelimi narily outline this dynamics with regard to antiquity.
In the Ancient World, globalization starts with the emergence of, and the contact between, the superpowers of the Late Bronze Age in the sec ond half of the second millennium BCE (Artzi 1969; . The change in cultural and political outlook, orientation or mentality from previous stages to this new stage of incipient globalization can be most clearly observed with respect to Ancient Egypt. During the O ld and Middle Kingdoms, that is, from 3000 until 1500 BCE, the Egyptians quite sim ply identified their world with the world in general. Egypt is seen as a cosmos, a sphere of order, surrounded by a zone of chaos, inhabited by nomadic tribes that it is important to hold at bay but not to conquer and integrate. The symbolic expression of this attitude is the same as in clas sical China: a great wall 'built to fence off the nomads' (Koch 1973, 224; . The extraEgyptian world only appears as part of god's creation Antiquity, and English is for today's internationalism. Such a lingua franca is the most important implement of globalization. The system of Bronze Age internationalism was characterized by plurality. The states and empires involved strove not towards hegemony, but towards security and control of the commercial routes. Security and control was reached by either subjugation or alliance.
Alliance -the formation of treaties -proved the most important instrument of internationalism. Forming an alliance required mutual recognition of the deities which served as patrons. The treaties which these empires formed with each other and with their vassals had to be sealed by solemn oaths invoking the gods of both parties. The list of these gods conventionally closes the treaty (Canfora et al. 1990 ). They had to be equal in their function and rank. Intercultural theology became a concern of international law (J. . Translating gods appears to be a technique for overcoming cultural and political bounda ries. Herodotus' desc ription of anc ient Egypt illustrates the general prin c iple: peoples, c ultures and politic al systems may be as different as, for example, anc ient Egypt, which is represented as the inversion of Greek normality. But when it comes to religion, it is possible to show that even the most exotic and extravagant peoples have a religion and they wor ship some definite and identifiable gods; thus, a common ground appears on whic h to build a treaty or other forms of c ontac t and c ooperation. The names, iconographies and rites that is, the cultures differ, but the gods are the same.
The end of the Bronze Age c orresponding to the end of the sec ond millennium BCE marks the end of internationalism and the advent of imperialism. The main instrument of globalization was now seen in con quest and politic al unification. The Assyrians started the list of empires of the new, imperialistic type. They were followed by the Babylonians, the Persians, Alexander the Great and his suc c essors and the Roman Empire. This is the advent of what Eric Voegelin dubbed 'the Ec umenic Age' (Voegelin 1984) . In my opinion, however, it appears more c orrec t to include the Late Bronze Age in this concept and to distinguish within it the two phases of internationalism and imperialism.
Let us now turn to the repercussions which these changes had for the organization of cultural memory. In Babylonia, the change is most c on spic uous. I am thinking here of the development known as the 'Kassite c anonization' of the Babylonian literary heritage whic h started in the seventeenth century and which ac hieved the status of a 'classical' tradi tion (Arnold 2004, 69ff.) . A new sc ribal elite emerged in these c enturies to which later generations of scribes in the first millennium BCE tried to trace back their pedigrees. The Kassite canonization meant a far-reaching reorganization of Baylonian cultural memory. The various oral and liter ary traditions were brought into line with standard versions and they were explicitly defended against any further alterations. The entire cul ture now acquired a strongly pastoriented attitude. These retrooriented tendencies were intensified enormously during the transition from interna tionalism to imperialism in the NeoAssyrian Empire of the ninth through seventh centuries. The canonization, philological cultivation and inter pretation of the literary heritage continued, Assurbanipal's palace library at Niniveh was the first comprehensive national library of the Ancient W orld and Assurbanipal himself boasted of his philological competence, for example of being able to read inscriptions from 'before the flood' (Maul 2001, 119) . Above all, however, Assyrian culture became marked by an extreme archaism. The time of the Sargonid kings, in the twenty third and twentysecond centuries BCE, was promoted to the rank of a normative past, a Golden Age, the model of everything important and valuable, and Mesopotamian society turned into a 'digging society' which tried to attain the canonized models of material and textual culture wherever possible (Jonker 1995) . This archaizing and antiquarian out look also gave rise to works of historiography. The past began to matter enormously for the Mesopotamian mind. These observations can be generally applied to the Ancient W orld. Several centuries after the end of the Bronze Age, we can observe in various parts the rise of literary attempts to elevate Bronze Age traditions to the status of a 'normative past': the Homeric Epic in Greece, the Exodus traditions in Israel, the Gilgamesh Epic in Mesopotamia and the canonization of 'The Book of the Dead' in Egypt.
The question is, however, whether this reorganization of cultural memory and this general reorientation towards the past should be seen as an accompaniment to, or rather as a reaction against imperial globali zation. There is an unmistakable spirit of competition and cultural pride at work that presupposes the idea of a global cultural market where it is important to obtain first place. Therefore, I view this reorganization of memory as an epiphenomenon rather than as a counterphenomenon of globalization.
In Egypt, we can observe pretty much the same cultural changes, although these occur some centuries later. The canonization of the literary heritage and the conception of the 'classics' occurred under the Ramesside kings in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries (J. Assmann 1985/1; 1985/2) , and archaism, the imitation of ancient models, began in the most con spicuous manner in the eighth through sixth centuries (J. Assmann 1996, Chapter 5) . If it is plausible to connect the Ramesside canoniz ation with a similar concept of cultural pride, it is absolutely inevitable that the pro nounc ed arc haism of the twentyfifth and twentysixth dynasty should be interpreted in terms of an anxiety of forgetting, reac ting against the destruc tions wrought upon the Egyptian c ulture by four Assyrian c on quests, which must have been experienc ed as a c atastrophe or even as a kind of trauma. Here, the reorientation towards the past may very well be interpreted as a first countermovement against imperial globalization.
However, the Assyrian c onquests c onsisted in sheer destruc tion and pillorying without any aspirations to cultural and c ivilizational generali zation. They were not ac c ompanied by any universalist ideas. This situ ation only c hanged with the Greeks. The Hellenization of the Anc ient World actually started long before Hellenism proper; it began in the West with the dispersion of Greek c olonies all over the Mediterranean, from Northern Spain to Naucratis in Egypt, and in the East by very intense ties with the Persian Empire. Greeks were everywhere; they worked as art ists and c raftsmen at Persepolis, at the Persian c ourt, and they travelled as intellectuals all over the Anc ient World (Hartog 1996) . Hellenization meant above all the diffusion of c ivilizational ac hievements suc h as the gymnasion, educ ational programmes and democ ratic institutions, and of universalist c onc epts suc h as sc ienc e, mathematic s, logic , metaphys ic s and enlightenment. This c ombination of politic al unific ation and intellec tual universalism is the hallmark of what Eric Voegelin c alled 'The Ec umenic Age'.
Hellenization had two fac es. On the one hand, it referred to the diffu sion of Greek language, ideas and customs all over the Ancient World; on the other hand, it appeared to be more of a construction of a 'c ommon c ulture', suggesting a similar c hange in Greec e as in the other c ultures. Flavius Josephus did not speak of 'Greek' but of 'common c ulture', ho koinos bios, as the goal of Jewish assimilation or reform in the Hellenistic age. In antiquity, imperialism never implied assimilation; that is, the impo sition of the laws and manners of the dominant c ivilization onto the subjugated soc ieties. The princ iple of imperialism had always been to rule the dependent c ountries ac c ording to their own laws and rules. For this purpose, however, the traditional c ustoms had to be codified, given the status of laws and enforc ed by the loc al and imperial authorities. Customs had to ac quire legal status in order to become instruments of rule. 5 This was the polic y of the Persians in Egypt and Judaea which was c ontinued by the Greek and Roman rulers and which only changed with the adoption of Christianity as statereligion. Problems arose when these loc al rules prec luded the observation of loyalty rules suc h as bowing before the statue of the emperor. Bowing before a statue does not mean assimilation; it is only a gesture of loyalty. Assimilation, therefore, was never a political issue but only a cultural option. Refusing the required gesture of loyalty, however, was interpreted as an act of rebellion, lead ing, perhaps already under the Seleucid King Antiochus IV Epiphanes, for the first time in history, to bloody persecution (Hengel 1988, 532ff.) . In this situation, the most important of these customs, such as circumci sion, abstaining from pork and keeping the Shabbat, acquired what is called 'a status confessionis'; that is, they required risking severe punish ment and even death rather than ceding. This situation, which had no parallel in other parts of the Ancient World, led to a separation of culture and religion. A new boundary was erected, unheard of in former times. You may assimilate into Hellenic or 'common' culture, but it is impos sible to assimilate into Jewish religion. This new concept of religion can only be entered through conversion, and even conversion is only open to those who belong to the 'seed of Abraham'. The opposite of conversion is apostasy, an equally new concept. This new concept of religion meant a redefinition of identity as well as of memory. In spite of its insistence on ethnic definition ('Abraham'), Judaism nevertheless became (along with Buddhism) the model for all later world religions whose principle is their transethnic and transnational character. World religions are book reli gions, and the Jews are the paradigmatic 'people of the book' (Halbertal 1997) . The Jewish canon is a clear case of a reaction and opposition to the pressures of globalization when the hegemonic regime viewed the observance of these particular laws as an act of rebellion.
The years of persecution, when, according to the somewhat biased account in 1 Maccabees, ancient imperialism turned into a kind of nation alism ('one nation, one culture'), showing its genocidal or rather, to use P ierre Clastres' term, 'ethnocidal' face (Clastres 1977, 9) 6 for the first time,
were also the years when the Book of Daniel was composed (165 BCE). This biblical book uses two visions to design a concept of world history as a sequence of four worldempires, starting with the Babylonians, followed by the Medes, the P ersians, and the Empire of Alexander as it became divided among his successors. Later, when the references to the events under Antiochus Epiphanes were no longer understood, the Fourth Empire became identified with the Romans, and since Daniel predicted the end of the world after the demise of the Fourth Empire, there was a strong interest in extending the Roman Empire as long as possible. This led the strange construction of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation to last until 1806 (A. Assmann 1999; K. Koch 1997; Delgado et al. 2003) . Even if the representation of the events of 165 BCE in 1 Maccabees is highly dubious in that the alleged persecution of the Jewish religion contradicts all principles of political reason as practised at that time (Weitzman 2004) , it is highly significant that the Jewish concepts of apocaly pticism and of marty rdom emerge in the same his toric al situation in the context of Greek imperialism and c oinc ide in the books of Daniel and Mac c abees.
There was, however, also another form of reaction to Hellenism whic h is exemplified, in the Jewish c ase, by the Septuagint, the Greek transla tion of the Hebrew Bible. The Septuagint is equally typic al of c ultural trends in the Anc ient World that reac t to globalism as is the Hebrew c anon. Greek language served two very different, perhaps even opposi tional func tions. On the one hand, its enormous eloquenc e and attrac tivity meant that it represented a highly seductive power of assimilation; that is, of c ultural forgetting. Greek was not only a lingua franc a, but it was also the vehic le of universal ideas and a superior lifestyle. On the other hand, however, Greek was exac tly this: a lingua franc a; that is, a medium rather than a message (Bowersoc k 1990). It provided a c om mon language in which loc al traditions and religions could be expressed in a voic e that was muc h more eloquent, flexible and artic ulate than their own. It allowed loc al traditions to become internationally visible. During more or less the same time as the c omposition of the Septuagint, the Chaldaean Berossos wrote his Babyloniaka, the Egyptian Manetho his Aigyptiaka and the Phoenic ian Philo of Byblos his Phoenic ian History. All of these codifications of cultural and historic al traditions pursue the same dual goal: to resc ue loc al traditions that were deemed endangered from oblivion, and to make them visible on the international stage of Graec oOriental literature. The boom of this literature c ontinued well into Late Antiquity with Flavius Josephus, Horapollon, Nonnos and many others. The c ulture of Late Antiquity owed at least as muc h to Indigenous influenc es as to the Greek heritage, and the Greek universe of language, thought, mythology and imagery bec ame less an alterna tive or even an antithesis to loc al traditions than a new way of giving voic e to them. Hellenism, in other words, not only provided a c ommon language, it also helped to disc over a common world and a 'c osmopoli tan' consciousness. It required or offered double membership: firstly to a native and sec ondly to a general c ulture. It did not mean the dissolution and loss of the one in favour of the other. The general culture ho koinos bios feeds on loc al c ultures.
The 'ec umenic age', therefore, c onfronts us with two options whic h are neatly opposed to eac h other. We may c all them 'fundamentalism' and 'sync retism'. The fundamentalist option operates by c odifying and canonizing a sanctified tradition. Mary Douglas has referred to this option as one of 'enclave cultures' (Douglas 1993) . The ecumenic age w as prolific in producing cultural enclaves that could also be charac terized as 'textual communities', because they typically used a canon of highly normative literature as their 'fundament' (Stock 1983) . The codification of memory served as a fortification of identity which had to be kept 'pure'. Instead of fundamentalism, we could also speak of purism or even Puritanism. In spite of, and perhaps even in opposition to, the flourishing GraecoEgyptian syncretism, we even encounter fun damentalist tendencies in Egypt. If we follow Herodotus, who visited Egypt in the middle of the fifth century, Egyptian culture had already taken a fundamentalist turn under Persian rule: 'They keep the ancestral laws and add none other. [ ...] They avoid the use of Greek customs, and generally speaking the customs of all other men'. 7 The temples became enclaves of ancient Egyptian religion. Here, rituals were performed according to ageold scripts in the classical language that had by now become a dead language, a kind of clerical Latin; the temples were deco rated to become containers of ancient ritual knowledge, inscribed from floor to ceiling, along walls, columns and doorways; and whole librar ies were cut into stone to ensure the preservation, presence and effi ciency of the ancient rituals beyond the imminent demise of Egyptian culture. It was an attempt to rescue not only the textual but even the ritual tradition from oblivion, and to ensure an identity based on ritual rather than textual continuity by means of transcodification into stone (J. Assmann 1992) . The option of syncretism, on the other hand, may be best illustrated by the GraecoEgyptian goddess Isis, who tended to identify with and to absorb virtually all of the other goddesses, not only of Egypt but of all known countries and religions in the Ancient World. The eleventh and last book of the Metamorphoses by Apuleius of Madaurus, written in the time of Marcus Aurelius, opens with a beautiful and highly significant scene that gives a vivid impression of the syncretistic tendencies of the GraecoEgyptian Isis religion. Lucius, a young man, who has been trans formed into an ass after carelessly dabbling in magic, awakens on the shore of the Mediterranean as the full moon rises from the sea. Books 1 to 10 had told of his trials and misfortunes, and Apuleius' Latin text seems to closely follow his Greek original. But the tone changes in the eleventh book, moving from the colourful and sometimes burlesque style of a picaresque novel into what A.D. Nock characterized as 'the highwater mark of the piety which grew out of the mystery religions' (Nock 1933, 138) . A new cha pter is opened a nd a new hope rises with the moon which is addressed by Lucius as follows: (Griffiths 1975, 70f., 114ff.) Lucius a ddresses a na meless power which he feels imma nent in a nd revea led by using four names that come to his mind: Ceres (Demeter), Venus (Aphrodite), Dia na (Artemis) a nd Proserpina (Persephone). The goddess answers him in a dream, presenting herself in a similar wa y:
Lo, I a m with you, Lucius, moved by your pra yers, I who a m the mother of the universe, the mistress of a ll the elements, the first off spring of time, the highest of deities, the queen of the dead, foremost of heavenly beings, the single form that fuses all gods and god d esses; 1 who order by my will the starry heights of heaven, the health giving breezes of the sea, and the awful silences of those in the und erworld : my single godhead is adored by the whole world in varied forms, in differing rites and with many d iverse names. The god d ess presents herself as a truly global d eity who 'fuses all god s and goddesses'. All divine names are hers. Aside from all of these infinite names, she also has a 'true name' (verum nomen) which only remained in use among the nations with the most ancient and authentic traditions: the Egyptians and their southern neighbours (her temple at Philae is situ ated on the southern frontier of Egypt, thus belonging both to Egypt and After a long list correlating Egyptian towns with names of Isis, th e text continues by naming places outside Egypt, such as Arabia, wh ere sh e is 'great goddess'; she is 'Leto' in Lycia; 'sage, freedom' in Myra; 'dispeller of attack, discoverer' in Cnidus; 'Isis' in Cyrene; 'Dictynnis' in Crete; 'Th emis' in Ch alcedon; 'warlike' in Rome; 'of th reefold nature' in th e Cyclades; 'young' on Patmos; 'h allowed, divine, gentle' in Paph os; 'march ing' on Ch ios; 'observer' in Salamis; 'all-bounteous' on Cyprus and so forth . It also includes foreign names: 'Atargatis' in Bamyce, 'Maia' among th e Indians and 'Astarte' in Sidon. The list is closed by a striking formula: 'the beautiful essence of all the gods' (th eon h apanton to kalon zoon).
Th e imperialism and internationalism of globalization in antiquity finds its most explicit expression in th e Graeco-Egyptian Isis religion. Both fundamentalism and syncretism react to th e assimilatory trend of globalization by a kind of rearmament of cultural memory. Th e dia lectic dynamics of globalization not only provoke waves of forgetting, they also initiate a boom of m em ory. Mem ory, to return to m y point of departure, is a m atter of identity and difference, and thus it is the opposite of globalization. Both form s of m em ory, however, im ply an elem ent if not of globalization, then of universalism : the fundam ental ist option in the form of world religion, the syncretistic option in the form of world literature. Aside from the Golden Ass or Metamorphoses of Apuleius, there is a wealth of novellas and rom ances that are related to the world of the m ysteries of Isis, and there are other religious m ove m ents that were equally prolific in literary text production.
However, the type of religion that won the day and which we have com e to classify as 'world religion' was the one that represents the char acter of a 'textual community' in that it implies the formation of a sacred canon: Judaism and the Tanakh, Christianity and the Christian Bible, Islam and the Koran, Buddhism and the PaliCanon, Jainism and the JainaCanon, Sikh religion and the Adi Granth, Daoism , Confucianism and so on with their respective canons down to the Morm ons and the Book of Mormon. There is not one world religion that does not base itself on a canon of holy writ. This strong alliance between religions of this new type and the form ation of canons and com m entaries illustrates once again the connection between m em ory and identity. The canon replaces the traditional fram es of cultural memory such as ethnos, hom e land, polity and ritual. The transition from the ethnically and culturally determ ined religions of the Ancient World to the new type of transcul tural and transnational world religion m eant a totally new construction of identity and a com plete reorganization of cultural m em ory. 11 The canon, in a way, functioned as a new transethnical hom eland and as 
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